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PROJECT
FOREWORD: WAGE GARNISHMENT-AN
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY RUN AMUCK
JUDGE MARK T. PATTERSON*
Statutes authorizing garnishment in Washington are not, by them-
selves, of extraordinary import.' If the state had retained its rural
character and the collection of debts had remained in the hands of the
original creditor or his attorney these statutes would rarely work any
injustice. In such a rural environment there is usually a personal
relationship between creditor and debtor that enables the creditor to
know firsthand whether his debtor is about to abscond or become in-
solvent. However, urbanization has become the dominant fact of life
for most of us and the collection of debts has become the province of
the professional bill collector on a mass collection basis. As a result,
statutes designed for use in the extraordinary case are systematically
applied to produce efficient collection results regardless of particular
justification for their use in individual cases.
In 1967 one thousand cases filed in Everett District Justice Court
were sampled (500 from January to March and 500 from July to
September). This sample revealed that 86 percent of these cases were
filed by professional collectors. Garnishments were filed in 311 of the
1,000 cases. The first writ was filed before judgment in 227 cases and
after judgment in 84 cases. Of the writs before judgment, 10 were
filed by private litigants (6 of whom were small loan companies). Of
the writs after judgment, 2 were by private parties. In the 227 cases
* Judge, Everett District justice Court. LL.B., 1963, University of Washington.
[Ed. Note: Everett, Snohomish County, is a city of about 50,000 located to the
north of Seattle, Washington. Its principal industries are aerospace, forest products,
and light manufacturing.]
'WAsH. Rrv. CODE § 12.32.010 (Supp. 1967):
The Justices of the Peace in this state may issue writs of garnishment.., where
the plaintiff sues for a debt which is just, due and unpaid;...
WASH. REv. CoDE § 12.32.020 (Supp. 1967):
Before the issuance of the writ of garnishment, the plaintiff, or someone in his
behalf, shall make application therefor by affidavit, stating the facts authorizing
the issuance of the writ and that he has reason to believe and does believe that the
garnishee is indebted to the defendant ....
For the Superior Court counterpart, see WAsH. REv. CoDE §§ 7.32.010-030 (1967).
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involving garnishment before judgment not one went to trial. The
usual notation on the docket was "Dismissed with Prejudice-settled."
The writer recalls only one case of the 2,600 cases filed in the Everett
Court in 1967 in which a defendant went to trial after a prejudgment
garnishment.
The Washington statutes have been quite uniformly interpreted by
justice courts and county clerks to allow a writ of garnishment to be
filed before a complaint has been served on the principal defendant.
2
Under this interpretation many collectors bring in a stack of com-
plaints accompanied by an equal number of writs of garnishment. The
clerk stamps the writs with the judge's name and leaves priority of
service to the informed discretion of a professional process server.
The primary complaint may not be served on the defendant until up
to 15 days after the writ of garnishment is served on his employer.'
Collectors who regularly use prejudgment garnishment admit that
they serve the garnishment first so that the defendant will come to
them without their having to go to him.
After presiding on the civil claims bench of the Everett District
Justice Court for a year, the writer is convinced that prejudgment
writs of garnishment are usually sought not as much for the purpose
of safeguarding funds as for the purpose of indirectly destroying the
ability of the principal defendant to assert any defense he might have
to the action. There are a number of facts which suggest this con-
clusion: first, some agencies are able to do well enough without using
prejudgment writs at all, while those who use them to any extent seem
to use them in all cases without apparent discrimination; second, a
person who has a job is usually a reasonably good risk because few
men will quit their job to beat a collector; finally, the type of company
which makes extensive use of prejudgment writs will file garnish-
ments on any size claim, even claims with less than twenty dollars at
issue. In one day's filing in the Everett District Justice Court the
writer found eight complaints from one collector accompanied by eight
writs of garnishment against eight different defendants, none of whom
2 In Snohomish County the judges of the district and superior courts have reconsid-
ered this interpretation and concluded that the legislature intended that at a minimum
the principal suit must be served on the principal defendant prior to the issuance of the
writ. Therefore writs are not available in this county until after the affidavit of service
is on file. This rule came after the sampling of cases from the Everett District Court.
A sample of 500 cases during the last three months of 1967 which came after the
adoption of the above rule shows that there were 100 garnishments, and of these, 40
occurred before and 60 after judgment had been granted.
'WASH. Civ. R.J. CT. 4(b) and 4(e).
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were alleged to owe more than sixteen dollars. One of these writs was
for the grand total of five dollars.
It is in collection of small debts that the most objectionable features
of the present system prevail. In both justice court and superior court,
garnishments are issued by the clerks of the court on the basis of
affidavits, written in the language of the statutes, in which the only
things not printed long in advance are the names of the defendant,
garnishee defendant, affiant and notary. The judges, by and large,
never see a writ until long after it has been issued. Once issued, the
writ will usually tie up until after judgment all wages4 owed the princi-
pal defendant at the time of service of the writ. The debtor-defendant,
if he has a wife and two children, may claim an exemption of fifty
dollars for each week's wages held.5 For most wage earners weekly
wages are the only asset of any real importance. Where there are
neither savings, benevolent friends, nor relatives to fall back on, the
loss of garnished wages, even for the three-week period between gar-
nishment and default judgment, may well mean eviction on a three-day
notice for failure to pay rent,' repossession of the car necessary for
transportation to the job, arrest for failure to make support payments,
or any number of hazards which afflict the man who is unable to meet
his obligations when due. If the defendant has a defense to a claim
which he wishes to assert at trial, he can expect to be parted from his
wages for an additional thirty to sixty days or more. Furthermore,
there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from filing additional writs
pending trial save the anticipated displeasure of a judge known not to
favor such maneuvers. The coercive nature of prejudgment garnish-
ment upon the poor is clear.
To illustrate the practicalities of the situation let us suppose that A
is sued by X for a bill originally in the amount of twenty dollars.
X is demanding thirty dollars plus interest since 1958. He further
demands a twenty-five dollar attorney fee. Besides his defense of the
statute of limitation, of which A is probably unaware, he has a defense
of discharge in bankruptcy. A is already one payment behind on his car
payment and has to commute thirty miles to work. The garnishment
has tied up $150.00. X will settle for $55.00 but will not recognize the
bankruptcy defense. Usually A will pay to get his money released.
'Garnishment of wages is the area of most serious abuse and the remarks made in
the course of this foreword should be construed to apply primarily to wages.
SWAsH. REv. CoDE §§ 12.32.250, 7.32.280 (Supp. 1967).
'WAsH. REV. CODE § 59.12.030(3) (1958).
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There are other adverse social aspects of garnishment in addition
to those outlined above. It is widely known that many employers dis-
charge their employees for having garnishments filed against them.7
For a person employed by a company which considers garnishment a
form of misconduct, the pressure is almost unendurable. He must
settle quickly or lose his job. This form of coercion rarely comes to
light in a court because people working for such employers either pay
what the collector asks or file bankruptcy on receipt of a letter threat-
ening garnishment.
For the man who has little in the world but his wages, the power to
garnish before judgment results in the de facto elimination of any
defenses that he may have in law. Also, the not-so-poor man who has
many years invested in a job will hesitate to put it in peril by fighting
an unjust claim for a small amount of money. Indeed, it can be said
that in the context of our present credit economy and urban environ-
ment, Washington's garnishment statutes amount to a substantial de-
privation of a debtor's constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law. However, such claims may not be accepted by
the Supreme Court given the present state of the law.
Under present garnishment procedures there is doubt whether
adequate notice or opportunity to be heard is afforded the principal
defendant before his right to accrued wages is taken from him.' Ser-
The %triter knows of no accurate list of employers who discharge for this cause,
but it i, kno%%n that the state's largest employer, the Boeing Company, will discharge
after the second garnishment and the Simpson Paper Company, a large employer in the
Everett Area, itill discharge on the first garnishment. Other employers follow similar
practices. There are some that do not discharge for garnishment, however. The
Veyerhaeuser _,mpany is representative of this group.
"Sec 114,ncrit. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
' 195o) -
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Procezs Clause, but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
hearing appropriate to the case....
Bit see Family Finance Corp. of Bayview v. Sniadich, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259
(1967), where it "as held that while garnishment before judgment does not provide
adequate notice or hearing to the principal defendant,
I . . garnihrnent before judgment proceedings do not involve any final determina-
tion of the title to a defendant's property, but merely preserve the status quo
thereof pending determination of the principal action. The defendant receives
notice and a hearing before being permanently deprived of his or her property.
Id., 154 N.W.2d at 262. The court refused to consider most of the abuses which have
been discussed above on grounds that a party will not be heard to urge the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute upon points not affecting his rights. The court failed to elaborate
how the man who has to settle an outrageously unfair claim in order to get food on
the table for his children is supposed to get his claim reviewed by any court.
The Wisconsin court's reliance on the concept of title, which may be useful in other
matters such as a replevin of sales, is something less than convincing in the garnish-
[ VOL. 43 : 735
FOREWORD
vice of the writ of garnishment on the employer may well be the first
notice the defendant debtor has that he is being sued. As much as
two weeks can then elapse before he is served with notice of the actual
lawsuit on the debt itself. How soon the debtor will have the oppor-
tunity to be heard in court on any defenses he might have depends
entirely on the condition of a particular court's calendar. In the court
in which the writer sits, this will be thirty to sixty days after service
of the writ. It is reasonable to expect that one who contests a suit on
which a writ has been issued and served on the date of filing will be
without his property for a minimum of sixty days.
Garnishment statutes, which allow plaintiffs, without any grounds
other than their status as plaintiffs, to take a defendant's property out
of his effective control deprive many persons of their right to be heard
in a court of law. To the small debtor, loss of a paycheck for a period
of six weeks may be the final straw driving him into bankruptcy. One
seriously doubts that it is any consolation to these defendants that
legal title to their property is unaffected by a prejudgment garnish-
ment. Every day people are losing their jobs because of this procedure
and because of employers' attitudes toward it. These evils turn what
was initially intended as an extraordinary remedy into a systematically
applied weapon for collection totally destructive of all rights of defen-
dants in the collector's court.
In addition to taking the defendant's property without notice or
hearing, these statutes, in practice, continually deprive defendants of
their right to any kind of a trial-fair or unfair.' It would not seem
amiss to note at this point that the Supreme Court of the United States
ment context. Loss of beneficial use of property is obviously as damaging, or more so,
than loss of title.
'The Wisconsin court decided this question of due process by reliance on three
United States Supreme Court decisions from the 1920's. McInnes v. McKay, 279 U.S.
820 (1928); Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Owenby v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). Mclnnes, in a one line per curiam decision, approved the
constitutionality of a Maine statute which gave plaintiffs a right of attachment without
affidavit or bond. In deciding the case, the Court relied on Coin and Owenby. The
Coffin case involved the placing of a lien on the property of stockholders of an insolv-
ent bank for one hundred percent contribution, as was required by the Georgia bank-
ing act. Owenby involved a procedure in which the plaintiffs were entitled to attach
the property of a foreign debtor and the defendant debtor was not allowed to defend
without posting bond for the total amount of plaintiff's complaint. The first thing that
will be noted about the latter two cases is that they present special situations: insolv-
ency in the first, and a debtor beyond the reach of the court in the second. Further,
the Coffln case presented a situation in which a large segment of the public was to be
protected. In view of these differences the court was perhaps a bit cavalier in deciding
the Mclnnes case by citing them. Except for Owenby, the cases have hardly been cited
since they were decided, nor have these points been reconsidered by the Supreme Court
since Mclnnes.
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has changed its views on due process in recent years. It is true that
most of the changes have been in the area of criminal procedure, but
they have often been made in decisions based ostensibly on the prem-
ise that due process requires that the poor defendant before the court
have the same opportunity for presenting his case as the rich defen-
dant."° A fair trial requires that a person not be prejudiced in his
presentation because of his economic status.
On a careful reading of the garnishment statutes one will observe
that all the plaintiff need set forth in his affidavit is that he is the
plaintiff and that he seeks the writ without intention to injure the
defendant. This affidavit says no more than the complaint. In effect,
then, the state legislature has authorized garnishment solely on the
basis that the plaintiff is the plaintiff. No special reason is required
for issuance such as the defendant's being beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, or about to flee, or about to become insolvent, or about to
hide his assets." One is hard pressed to justify as rational the present
categorization of the parties when one is talking about the burden of
requiring the defendant, at the pleasure of the plaintiff, to post as
security one or more pay checks for the right to come into court and
assert his defense. To justify such a distinction one would have to
make a legislative finding that defendants uniformly owe what plain-
tiffs say they owe and that defendants are therefore wasting everyone's
time by litigating, and that in order to discourage litigation defendants
should be penalized for defending. Experience in the writer's court
indicates that such a finding would be less than accurate. There are
some collection companies that seem utterly incapable of filing a com-
plaint that is supportable in full by the evidence. Nor is there any
indication that plaintiffs are more virtuous than defendants. For ex-
ample, one of my colleagues on a justice court bench found that one
of the collection companies was uniformly padding the mileage on its
affidavits of service. In addition, under the new check collection
statute, RCW § 62A.3-501, requiring notice of dishonor as a prereq-
uisite to a claim for a collection charge, the collectors always allege
having given such notice. However, in those cases which the writer
has been able to check, it is quite clear that such notice has not been
10See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
" The equal protection clause allows the legislatures of the several states to make
classifications so long as the classifications are reasonable, Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S.
730 (1903), "rational in nature," Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), and not "in-
vidiously discriminatory," Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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given and that the collection charge was attempted to be exacted
illegally. No doubt there are many dishonest defendants who use the
legal process to avoid or delay the payment of their just debts, but
experience shows no such overbalance of virtue in favor of plaintiffs as
to justify adding to their arsenal such a weapon as prejudgment gar-
nishment.
CONCLUSION
There are cases on the basis of which the present Washington
statute can be upheld as constitutional. Whether these cases actually
remain the law of the land although they have not been expressly
overruled is open to question. It cannot be denied, however, that a
case can be made for legislative change in the interest of the people of
the state. The facts are clear to anyone who wishes to seek them out.
Because of the defendants' financial inability to withstand the pressure
of a writ of garnishment, unscrupulous collectors through the use of
this statute are every day recovering unjust judgments and depriving
defendants of their day in court. It is equally clear that the remedy
is used primarily by professional bill collectors and not for the pro-
tection of plaintiffs. The statute is being used so unfairly that, consti-
tutional or not, it should at least be changed substantially by the
legislature for the protection of the people of this state.'2
For a practicing attorney's views on wage garnishment see Friedman, The Repos-
sessed, THE NEw REPuBmc, April 27, 1968, at 8.
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